Business & Economics Society International (B&ESI)

41st B&ESI Conference
Corinthian Gulf, Loutraki, Greece
Club Hotel July 15-18, 2024

Hotel Details:
Club Hotel, 48 Posidonos Str, 20300 Loutraki, Greece
Tel: +302744060300,
Fax: +302744060306,
Email: info@clubhotelloutraki.gr
Web: https://www.clubhotelloutraki.gr/hotel/en/
### Excursion Details (please click [here](#)); all excursions at extra cost

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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| **Sunday, July 14, 2024** | Pre-Conference Day-Long Excursion (starting from hotel at 9:00 AM):  
**Delphi (meals on your own)**  
Pre-registration (5:00 PM – 6:00 PM)  
Welcome Reception (6:00 PM – 7:00 PM) |
| **Monday, July 15, 2024** | Registration & Sessions: 8:00 AM – 4:00 PM  
Afternoon / Evening Excursion (after Sessions, starting from hotel at 4:00 PM):  
**Ancient Corinth (with Dinner)** |
| **Tuesday, July 16, 2024** | Registration & Sessions: 8:00 AM – 4:00 PM  
Afternoon / Evening Excursion (after Sessions, starting from hotel at 4:00 PM):  
**Ancient Nemea (with wine-tasting & Dinner)** |
| **Wednesday, July 17, 2024** | Registration & Sessions: 8:00 AM – 1:40 PM  
Lunch & Keynote Speaker: 1:40 PM – 3:40 PM  
Afternoon / Evening Excursion (after Sessions, starting from hotel at 4:00 PM):  
**Nafplio (with Diner)** |
| **Thursday, July 18, 2024** | Afternoon / Evening Excursion (after Sessions, starting from hotel at 4:00 PM):  
**Monastery & Ancient Harbor (with Dinner)** |
| **Friday, July 19, 2024** | Post-Conference Day-Long Excursion (starting from hotel at 9:00 AM):  
**Athens, Acropolis (inclusive of Acropolis Museum) & Plaka (meals on your own)** |
TITLE OF TALK:
A Field Manual for the cradle of civilization: theory of leadership and lessons from Iraq

ABSTRACT:
The US Army’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Bremer’s My Year in Iraq, and Xenophon’s Education of Cyrus all consider problems of establishing a state. Bremer sees constitutions as fundamental, and the Field Manual emphasizes local security operations and effective governance to establish legitimacy. But Xenophon shows how states are founded by leaders with reputations for reliably rewarding supporters. Agency incentive problems in government make patronage an essential aspect of state-building, and political leaders become fundamentally constrained by their reputations. Democratic competition requires many leaders to develop independent reputations for exercising power and patronage responsibly, which can be encouraged by political decentralization.

BRIEF BIOGRAPHY:
Dr. Roger Myerson is the David L. Pearson Distinguished Service Professor of Global Conflict Studies in the Harris School of Public Policy and the Griffin Department of Economics at the University of Chicago, USA.

Dr. Myerson has made seminal contributions to the fields of economics and political science. In game theory, he introduced refinements of Nash’s equilibrium concept, and he developed techniques to characterize the effects of communication among rational agents who have different information. His analysis of incentive constraints in economic communication introduced several fundamental concepts that are now widely used in economic analysis, including the revelation principle and the revenue-equivalence theorem in auctions and bargaining. Myerson has also applied game-theoretic tools to political science, analyzing how political incentives can be affected by different electoral systems and constitutional structures.


Dr. Myerson has a Ph.D. from Harvard University and taught for 25 years in the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University before coming to the University of Chicago in 2001. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the National Academy of Sciences, the American Philosophical Society, and the Council on Foreign Relations. He has received the Jean-Jacques Laffont Prize in 2009 and several honorary degrees. He was awarded the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in recognition of his contributions to mechanism design theory, which analyzes rules for coordinating economic agents efficiently when they have different information and difficulty trusting each other.
FURTHER PROGRAM DETAILS
FORTHCOMING